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BOILING DOWN BOILERPLATE IN M&A AGREEMENTS: A
RESPONSE TO
CHOI, GULATI, & SCOTT
ROBERT ANDERSON†
JEFFREY MANNS††
ABSTRACT
“Boilerplate” consists of standardized terms whose meaning is
intended to be consistent from one transaction to the next, and these
provisions are ubiquitous in contracts and related transactional
documents. In their recent Duke Law Journal article Stephen Choi,
Mitu Gulati, and Robert Scott have highlighted the potentially
corrosive effect of the legal drafting process on boilerplate
provisions. They show how incremental edits to boilerplate pari
passu clauses for sovereign debt agreements have led to textual
“black holes,” which potentially undercut the standardization
purpose, wording, and substantive meaning of these boilerplate
provisions. In this Article we offer preliminary evidence of a similar
textual “black hole” phenomenon taking place in the mergers and
acquisitions context.
We show that the mergers and acquisition context epitomizes the
problem of unreflective copying of precedent provisions combined
with ad hoc edits to individual clauses, which erode the textual
integrity and meaning of boilerplate provisions. Each agreement is
based on a prior deal precedent, and drafters frequently incorporate
sections of the prior deal without sufficient scrutiny about the degree
to which idiosyncratic novelties have been introduced in the
precedent document that may be inapplicable to the new deal. At the
same time, high levels of “editorial churning” take place in the
process of transforming each precedent into the current acquisition
agreement. The result is a problem of “drafting drift.” Boilerplate
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provisions live on from deal to deal, yet gradually shed their textual
integrity and potentially lose their clear meaning as ad hoc edits are
copied from deal to deal and new ad hoc edits are added at each
stage.
We show how it is possible to identify the paragraphs of
acquisition agreements which serve as boilerplate and to document
both the degree and type of textual “drift” of these provisions over
multiple generations. We construct “family trees” for boilerplate
provisions by tracing the ancestors of each provision backwards in
a linear way to each prior precedent. Then we reverse the process
to show how ancestor provisions have progeny extending out in
multiple directions which become increasingly dissimilar to their
original ancestor and to each other over a few generations of
acquisition agreements.
Our study shows that incremental changes in boilerplate from
one generation to the next foster rapid “speciation” of the terms.
Small additions and deletions from boilerplate text lead to
significant cumulative effects over multiple generations. We
demonstrate that this textual “drift” takes place both within
individual boilerplate lineages, but also even more broadly for
boilerplate provisions that have a common ancestor precedent, yet
evolve separately along different lineages of precedents. Like the
Big Bang, the heterogeneity of boilerplate text appears to increase
in all directions, which supports an “expanding universe” theory for
boilerplate that undermines the textual integrity and the meaning of
boilerplate terms. While we will expand on the quantitative and
qualitative analysis of the evolution of boilerplate in a future work,
the preliminary evidence presented in this paper reinforces the case
for the textual “black hole” theory.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of boilerplate terms heightens legal certainty, drafting
efficiency, and the universality of provisions by providing uniform language
whose meaning has stood the test of time.1 The challenge is that legal drafters
frequently compose transactional documents that are neither completely
negotiated nor completely standardized. Lawyers routinely recycle
boilerplate provisions from earlier precedents. But instead of adhering to
boilerplate language, lawyers often appear to engage in idiosyncratic edits
that gradually transform the text of ostensibly standardized language.
In their recent Duke Law Journal article, Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati,
and Robert Scott used the sovereign debt agreement context to show how
over time textual “black holes” have developed as edits aggregate from deal
to deal and warp the textual integrity and meaning of boilerplate provisions.2
In this piece, we provide preliminary evidence that the “black hole” drafting
pathology identified by Choi, Gulati, and Scott extends beyond the sovereign
debt context and also characterizes the drafting process in mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) transactions.3
In our recent article, The Inefficient Evolution of Merger Agreements,4
we show how M&A agreements combine elements of standardization with
high levels of “editorial churning,” ad hoc edits that appear to be cosmetic
rather than substantive. This combination fosters high levels of “speciation”
among merger agreements, which causes agreements as a whole (at the
“macro” level) to bear little similarity to their precedent progenitors even
over a few generations. In a subsequent article we applied those insights
about macro-level agreement drift to suggest pathways to greater efficiency
in M&A drafting.5 That work only looked at agreements as a whole,

1. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization & Innovation in Corporate
Contracting, 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719–20 (1997) (discussing the potential “learning benefits” of
commonly used terms); Michael Klausner, Standardization & Innovation in Corporate Contracting, 81
VA. L. REV. 757, 783–84 (1995) (discussing the network benefits from familiarity with boilerplate terms).
2. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu G. Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial
Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–4 (2017) (discussing the black hole problem in the context of the pari
passu clause, a boilerplate provision in sovereign debt contracts); see also Christopher J. French, The
Illusion of Insurance Contracts, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. 535 (2017) (discussing the difficulties of determining
the intent of drafters of standard form language in insurance contracts).
3. See Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 2, at 4 (discussing the need for broader empirical research
on the extent of rote usage and encrustation in boilerplate provisions).
4. Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of Merger Agreements, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 57 (2017).
5. Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Engineering Greater Efficiency in Mergers and Acquisitions,
72 BUS. LAW. 657 (2017).
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potentially overlooking evolution in individual paragraphs and sections of
boilerplate text (at the “micro” level).
In this Article we shift our focus to the micro-level of boilerplate clauses
of M&A agreements to examine how editorial churning affects the drafting
process. We show how cosmetic edits rapidly accumulate over time and
distort the form of boilerplate provisions in M&A agreements, which we
would expect to change rarely, if ever, from one deal to the next. Our
preliminary findings in the M&A context support the textual “black hole”
thesis. Lawyers’ “rote usage” of boilerplate without examination of the
terms, coupled with “encrustation,” the retention of idiosyncratic textual
variations, have undercut the meaning of boilerplate provisions and created
the preconditions necessary for textual “black holes.”
What distinguishes our approach from that of Choi, Gulati, and Scott is
the scale and method of analysis that we use to analyze this drafting
pathology in the distinctive M&A context. M&A is different from most other
contractual settings because of the extent of its artisanal drafting and lack of
standardization. This fact makes analyzing the evolution of M&A boilerplate
important, since these provisions serve as some of the few sources of
standardization. We leverage our data set of over 12,000 public company
merger agreements from 1994 to 2014 to create a comprehensive picture of
the evolution of boilerplate provisions over time. We use a computer
program to identify and analyze the word-for-word differences between
boilerplate provisions. This approach allows us to measure the degree of
textual similarity or dissimilarity based on the number of insertions and
deletions (i.e., edits) in boilerplate provisions across agreements.
We show how it is possible to identify the paragraphs of acquisition
agreements which serve as boilerplate and demonstrate both the degree and
type of textual “drift” of these provisions over multiple generations. We
construct “family trees” for boilerplate provisions by tracing the descendants
of each “ancestor” provision. We show that common ancestors have progeny
extending out in multiple directions which become increasingly dissimilar to
each other over a few generations of acquisition agreements. This textual
“drift” takes place within individual boilerplate lineages. The textual “Big
Bang” effect is even more pronounced for boilerplate provisions that have a
common ancestor precedent, but evolve separately along different lineages
of precedents. We also show spatially that the pattern of boilerplate
“speciation” underscores the high impact of editorial churning in
undercutting standardization of boilerplate.
Our preliminary findings suggest that the macro-problem of acquisition
agreement “speciation” takes place throughout the micro-level of boilerplate
provisions. Lawyers appear to recycle boilerplate without giving adequate
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thought to the meaning of this language or the impact of editorial changes.
The result is “drafting drift.” Boilerplate provisions live on from deal to deal,
yet gradually shed their textual integrity and potentially lose their clear
meaning as ad hoc edits are copied from deal to deal and new ad hoc edits
are added at each stage. The random variations that the “encrustation” and
“abrasion” of boilerplate text introduce in the drafting process appear to be
even more severe in the merger agreement context than in other contractual
settings, leading to rapid drift away from the original boilerplate.
Part I lays out our data and methodology as well as delineate the
distinctive challenges of identifying boilerplate in non-standardized
documents. Part II provides empirical evidence substantiating the high
degree of textual drift within both lineages of boilerplate and the even more
extensive drift between the divergent branches of boilerplate with a common
precedent ancestor. Part III discusses some of the implications and
shortcomings of this study that we will address in greater detail in a future
work.
I. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Situating the Boilerplate Study in Our Larger Project
This Article builds on our larger project of systematically examining
the evolution of public company merger agreements and exposing the high
degree of editorial churning.6 In that piece, we documented the extensive
“drift” in merger agreements over time as precedents are used, edited, and
reused in deals. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandates
disclosure of public company acquisition agreements, which provide a
window into the end product of lawyering that the public often is unable to
see in other areas of transactional law.7 The challenge, however, is that no
one outside of the drafting deliberations can witness the process that leads to
the formation of acquisition agreements. Ironically, even the lawyers
involved in any given transaction may not necessarily appreciate the full
implications of the drafting give and take on the substance of the legal text.
The myriad of lawyers involved in drafting, the scale of the edits, and the
compressed time period of drafting means that no one involved in the
transaction may be positioned to scrutinize the full extent and potential
impact of textual changes.

6. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 4.
7. See SEC, FORM 8-K, ITEM 1.01, at 4, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WE5G-A7CY] (requiring companies to disclose material definitive agreements outside of the
ordinary course of business including merger agreements).
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We seek to reverse engineer the drafting process to identify potential
inefficiencies and textual distortions by analyzing the evolution of public
company acquisition agreements provisions.8 In our previous study we
leveraged SEC-mandated disclosures to compile a dataset of public company
mergers from 1994 to 2014, which covers over 12,000 agreements.9 In this
Article we use this dataset to examine micro-level evolution of deal-terms.
Acquisition agreements are so complex, and the legal stakes so high, that
nearly every public company merger agreement is based on an earlier
acquisition agreement that serves as its precedent.10 We use computer textual
analysis tools to show how it is possible to identify the precedent which
serves as the template for the drafting of each deal.11 We leverage computer
technology to lift the veil on the drafting process by showing how
agreements are created and how both documents as a whole and individual
provisions change in incremental ways over time.12
8. Other notable empirical works also examine changes in contractual provisions in other
transactional contexts. See, e.g., MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE 3½ MINUTE TRANSACTION:
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 3–10 (2013) (using empirical data to show that
once a boilerplate provision is in place it often becomes part of a transactional checklist regardless of its
actual value-added); Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical
Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 930, 932–34 (2004) (conducting empirical analysis of
sovereign bond offerings to show that boilerplate provisions changed in response to significant shifts in
the interpretation of key provisions, but only after an industry-wide delay which reflected the reluctance
of lawyers to change boilerplate provisions); Jonathan C. Lipson, Price, Path and Pride: Third Party
Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59,
113–14 (2005) (using qualitative interviews to assess the logic behind lawyers’ drafting of third-party
closing opinions).
9. See supra note 7.
10. See SCOTT J. BURNHAM, DRAFTING AND ANALYZING CONTRACTS: A GUIDE TO THE PRACTICAL
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 5–6 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing how attorneys “rarely
start to draft on a blank slate. . . . [and generally] start with an existing contract or form”).
11. See TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: HOW AND WHY LAWYERS DO WHAT THEY DO
335–36 (2007) (discussing the benefits of heightened efficiency and legal certainty from precedent-based
legal drafting).
12. Two other notable empirical studies provide similar prisms for understanding the M&A drafting
process, yet reach different conclusions. Professor Coates documents the growth in length of merger
agreements over the past twenty years, which he attributes to changes in legal risks and deal and financing
markets, as well as the increase in “linguistic complexity’ of these documents. See generally John C.
Coates, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years of Deals, (European Corp. Gov.
Inst., Working Paper No. 333/2016, 2016), at 16–28, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2862019.
Professor Jennejohn argues that the complexity of M&A exposes acquisition agreements to multiple
sources of path dependency which undercuts efforts at standardization. See generally Matthew Jennejohn,
Assymetric Standardization in M&A Agreements (Mar. 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors). Numerous other studies have examined the development of particular acquisition agreement
provisions. See generally Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse
Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161 (2010) (discussing attempts at reallocating deal risks through
reverse termination fees that compensate target companies should the buyer walk away, and assessing the
impact such attempts have on acquisition agreement drafting); Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic
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By identifying the precedent for each deal, we are able to pinpoint the
exact edits from one deal to the next. We can analyze the overall extent of
edits to highlight potential churning as well as identify individual changes
within particular provisions. Additionally, we can assess the degree to which
a particular section of the agreement remains consistent from deal to deal
(e.g. a truly boilerplate provision) or is the focal point of drafting activity.
This approach allows us to show empirically that a high level of
“editorial churning” takes place as merger agreements appear riddled with
edits that are cosmetic and unnecessary.13 The drafting of every acquisition
agreement necessarily entails deal-specific edits and reflects a fusion of the
vision for the agreement from both parties as they seek to frame or reframe
terms to their advantage.14 Additionally, innovations are taking place in
acquisition agreements in a more episodic fashion in response to exogenous
events. But our analysis found that over half of the text of merger agreements
is routinely rewritten from one deal to the next, suggesting that there is a
high level of inefficiency in the precedent selection and drafting process that
cannot be explained away in terms of substantive changes in acquisition
agreements.15
Our initial study demonstrated that public merger agreement terms are
not based off a common “form” agreement, but rather are the product of a
highly path-dependent “evolution” over many generations.16 This point is

Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848 (2010) (arguing
that before closing the deal, the intentional vagueness of material adverse change (“MAC”) clauses
creates more efficient incentives for the seller, rather than more precise and less costly proxies); Yair Y.
Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 846
(discussing how unclear judicial interpretations of the contours of MAC clauses and material adverse
effect (“MAE”) clauses cast a shadow over merger deals); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz,
Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330 (2005) (using economic
modeling to analyze the role that MAC and MAE clauses play in the structure of the standard acquisition
agreement and the incentive effects for acquirers and targets); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions
in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2003) (discussing the significance of Delaware’s
judicially created limitations on deal protection provisions meant to resolve the conflicting incentives of
the acquirer’s and target’s management when facing last minute third-party bids); Claire A. Hill,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 191 (2009) (arguing that the legal terms in acquisition agreements are intentionally ambiguous
to deter litigation and incentivize negotiators to close the deal); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010) (arguing for interpretative default rules in
construing MAC clauses).
13. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 4, at 61–62; see also infra Part III.
14. See Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law
of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 277 (1990) (discussing the tradeoffs between
standardization and customization in contractual drafting).
15. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 4, at 75–77.
16. See id. at 82–83.
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true even within large law firms where drafts are based on prior agreements
rather than standardized form language. The absence of even firm-specific
forms has led to haphazard and inconsistent lawyering, as lawyers add
significant amounts of deal-specific edits to each deal and inadvertently
retain deal-specific information from prior deals.
Our initial paper reflected a macro-view of editorial churning in
assessing the extent of word changes from precedent to the final deal in each
of the 12,000 agreements, however we did not engage in fine-grained
analysis of particular provisions to test our hypothesis of drafting
inefficiency. For this reason our original paper did not directly support the
“black hole” theory. Although we found extensive editing between precedent
and final draft, it is possible that legal drafters were simply integrating
paragraphs or whole sections of text as they engaged in innovative
lawyering.17
In this paper we address this limitation of our prior study by examining
the extent of changes in individual boilerplate provisions from deal to deal.
Our preliminary findings are that similar editorial churning and drift are
apparent when provisions are examined on a clause-by-clause basis as well
as when agreements are examined as a whole. Our data shows that
boilerplate provisions like virtually every other part of acquisition
agreements are drifting over time due to incremental changes in each
agreement which have cumulative effects over multiple generations.
Haphazard editing takes place throughout virtually every part of acquisition
agreements which afflicts even ostensibly standardized boilerplate language
and potentially erodes the text and meaning.
B. Methodology
Our study compiled a data set of 12,407 merger agreements filed with
the SEC between 1994 and 2014 and performed a word-for-word
comparison of each of these documents.18 The computer script visited each
URL contained in the Archive Indices of the SEC EDGAR Database and
collected the full text of each acquisition agreement.19 We excluded any

17. Cf. Coates, supra note 12, at 16–28 (arguing that the doubling in the length of merger
agreements over the past twenty years reflects responses to changes in legal risks and deal and financing
markets, as well as the increase in the linguistic complexity of these documents).
18. See Archive Indices of the SEC EDGAR Database, SEC (last modified Apr. 28, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/edgar_archive_indices [https://perma.cc/USL4-V94J].
19. Exhibit 2 is the exhibit where merger agreements are filed, along with any other “plan of
acquisition, reorganization, arrangement, liquidation or succession.” See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(2)
(1995). Such agreements can also be filed under Exhibit 10, but primarily when they relate to other
companies, such as subsidiaries.
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document whose title did not contain “merger” or “reorganization” to ensure
that we were not including any non-acquisition agreements.20 We also
excluded
duplicative
agreements,
intra-firm
reorganizations,
reincorporations in other states, and private company acquisitions.21 We also
eliminated older plain-text agreements for which paragraph demarcations are
unreliable,22 resulting in a focus of a subset of our database on agreements
filed after 2001.
The key to our analysis is the use of a computer program to engage in a
word-for-word comparison of each agreement to every other agreement in
the data set. The underlying premise is that a document retains substantial
word-for-word similarity to its precedent document even after a high degree
of edits. While every drafting process entails a degree of deal-specific
changes, we can still identify the textual “DNA” linking a document to its
precedent. This similarity is not present among documents that were not
copied directly or indirectly from one another, even when the documents
deal with identical subject matter.
The same logic applies for our comparison of boilerplate provisions
from precedent to subsequent agreement across numerous generations. The
computer program calculated the “edit distance” (also known as the
Levenshtein distance) between each pair of agreements.23 Edit distance is a
method for measuring the extent of textual similarity or dissimilarity based
on the number of insertions and deletions (i.e., edits) that differentiate two
documents.24 The concept is analogous to the traditional “blacklining” or
“redlining” process of comparing two documents with one another, which is
20. This approach eliminates agreement types that may overlap such as “Contribution Agreement,”
“Stock Purchase Agreement,” “Asset Purchase Agreement,” “Transaction Agreement,” “Share Exchange
Agreement,” “Arrangement Agreement,” and the like. Although these agreements certainly contain
overlapping language, this study focused on documents that were clearly public company acquisition
agreements. Very short documents that are less than 15,000 characters were also eliminated because these
agreements likely did not address the complex issues raised in larger public company acquisitions. Mutual
holding company conversions were also excluded.
21. Near duplicates were defined as those documents filed within 100 days of each other and having
97 percent or more similarity to one another. Most of these were the identical document, but some were
amended and restated versions of the same document. Many of the documents contained extraneous text
such as attachments to the main merger agreement. To remove this text, this study disregarded text
following the first occurrence (if any) of “In witness whereof,” which typically signals the end of a merger
agreement.
22. The paragraph demarcations are unreliable because paragraphs are separated with carriage
returns but so are page breaks, making it ambiguous in many cases whether particular text is separated
by a new paragraph or a new page. The HTML documents have tags indicating new paragraphs and
therefore do not suffer from this problem.
23. See DAN GUSFIELD, ALGORITHMS ON STRINGS, TREES, AND SEQUENCES: COMPUTER SCIENCE
AND COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 215–16 (1997) (discussing the Levenshtein distance).
24. See id.
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routinely used in transactional law drafting. This approach is also similar to
those used to detect plagiarism in writing, which can detect common ancestry
of texts even after significant editing.25
The difference in our approach is that we are seeking to assess
quantitatively the degree of difference between each agreement in our dataset
in order to determine which agreement is most likely to form the precedent
for the drafting of a subsequent agreement. The computer program allowed
us to engage in this comparative analysis for each agreement in our database.
As a result, we were able to identify the likely precedent document for each
merger agreement in the database by determining which document had the
smallest length-normalized pairwise edit distance (among those with earlier
dates than the given document). This finding provided us with a window for
seeing the starting point and the end result for the drafting of each acquisition
agreement, so that we could establish quantitatively the degree of edits in
each transaction. We then compared the individual paragraphs in the
descendant agreement to its ancestor agreement to determine the source for
each paragraph in the descendant.
C. The Backdrop of Evidence of Inefficiency in M&A Agreements
The starting point for every M&A deal entails the selection of a
precedent agreement, which serves as the textual base from which the deal
document is drafted. M&A agreements typically reflect a process of backand-forth negotiations between the acquirer and target (and their counsel).
Typically, the lawyers for the acquirer select the precedent to use as the base
for the agreement, customize the draft to fit the needs of the current deal, and
forward the agreement to the target.26 Counsel for the target will then
propose changes to the acquirer’s draft and initiate negotiations which focus
on changes to particular provisions rather than the “form” of the agreement.27
This process goes back-and-forth several times before the draft is finalized.

25. See, e.g., Zhan Su et al., Plagiarism Detection Using the Levenshtein Distance and SmithWaterman Algorithm, 2008 Innovative Computing Info. & Control 569, 569–72.
26. See ROBERT A. FELDMAN & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, DRAFTING EFFECTIVE CONTRACTS: A
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 1-20 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing basic strategies in drafting contracts); JAMES C.
FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 26–27 (1975) (discussing how the power to make the first draft gives the drafter leverage
over other parties).
27. See Thomas E. Tyner, Mechanics of Document Drafting, in DRAFTING BUSINESS CONTRACTS:
PRINCIPLES, TECHNIQUES & FORMS 1-1, 1-16 (2015) (discussing the limitations lawyers face in
suggesting revisions to a draft); FREUND, supra note 25, at 28 (“Typically, the seller should live with the
purchaser’s form of agreement, without being precluded in any way from negotiating any and all
substantive matters.”).
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In theory the reliance on a precedent agreement suggests that lawyers
and clients value the legal certainty that comes from building on precedents
and boilerplate provisions whose language has stood the test of time (and of
courts). Additionally, one might expect that acquisition agreements would
have significant textual similarity since they generally follow similar broad
outlines of categories of provisions. But contrary to these plausible
hypotheses we found that there was little evidence of standardization among
merger agreements. Not only was there significant divergence in the text
from each agreement to its precedent, but there was also remarkable diversity
in the merger templates that law firms used. Table I, excerpted from our prior
article, highlights the small degree of commonalities among merger
agreements based on word-for-word comparisons.28
Table I. Similarity Distribution of the Data
Percentage of Pairwise
Comparisons
More than 30%
0.5%
Similar
25–30% Similar
3.8%
20–25% Similar
44.7%
15–20% Similar
40.3%
10–15% Similar
7.4%
Less than 10%
3.4%
Similar
Median
19.9%
Mean
19.5%
*Based on a sample of 50,000 random comparisons drawn
from the documents.
The most striking finding is that only 4.3 percent of agreements were
more than 25 percent the same despite the fact that they had nearly identical
substantive provisions and subject matter. These findings suggest that the
world of acquisition agreements is strikingly diverse even though these
agreements deal with similar categories of information, and even though
each agreement is based on a precedent. The mean and median degree of
similarity of documents were less than 20 percent, which suggests that there
is only a small core of standardization that cuts across the agreements.
28. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 4, at 70 & Tbl. I.
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Another step in our empirical analysis entailed examining the degree of
divergence between each precedent and the resulting agreement. The
previous paragraph discusses similarity of random chosen pairs, but here we
are examining the similarity between agreements related to each other. While
we show earlier the extensive degree of diversity among acquisition
agreements, the most telling evidence of inefficiency is the high level of
editorial churning in the drafting process even in documents copied from one
another. Figure I, drawn from our prior article, shows the percentage of the
textual similarity between documents and their precedents, assessed at the
whole document level.29

Figure I. Similarity of Documents to Precedents
Figure I highlights the high degree of editorial churning that takes place
during the drafting process. While there are significant outliers on both ends
of similarity and dissimilarity, the largest number of acquisition agreements
have approximately 50 percent similarity to their nearest precedent. Some
acquisition agreements have 80 percent or greater similarity with their
precedents. But most of these documents are repeat-player acquisitions
involving the same acquirer which means they have limited applicability to
the broader pattern of precedent selection.
It would be challenging to assess the precise degree of inefficiency
because deal-specific edits are an essential part of every deal, and the degree
of edits will necessarily vary based off of the transaction. But we can

29.

See id. at 75 & Fig. 2.
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estimate the amount of time that lawyers are investing in the drafting process
to put the potential degree of editorial churning in context. From 1994 to
2014 the median number of words in an acquisition agreement increased
from about 21,000 words to approximately 39,400 words a year.30 The rate
of increase was just over 900 words a year as there was a remarkable
“accretion effect” that led to a near doubling in the length of the average
acquisition agreement. Table II highlights the dramatic increase in the length
of merger agreements over time.
Table II. Average Length of Acquisition Agreements from 1994–2014

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

Average
Number of
Words
21,013.5
22,435.5
21,110.0
21,653.0
22,582.0
23,850.0
24,685.0
25,601.0
26,186.5
26,697.0
27,378.0
29,116.0
30,360.0
31,992.0
33,134.0
35,344.5
35,941.0
37,467.5
36,736.0
37,614.0
39,403.0

Of course some of this additional word count may be justified by legal
responses to exogenous events or other substantive developments in the
30. See id. at 75–76; see also Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Engineering Greater Efficiency in
Mergers and Acquisitions, 72 BUS. LAW. 657, 678–79 & Tbl. IV.
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architecture of acquisition agreements. But while Professor Coates has
pointed to some degree of substantive changes over this period,31 in reality
there appears to be little substance to justify this dramatic expansion in the
length of merger agreements.
The evidence of a consistently high level of editing suggests that
lawyers are ineffectively engaging in precedent selection and document
design throughout the drafting process. Some deals may require more edits
because of the unique nature of the deal, but “revolutionary” deals are few
and far between, and the degree of editorial churning that routinely occurs in
the deal process suggests that there is inefficiency in the precedent selection
and document design.
D. The Challenge of Delineating Boilerplate
Having provided evidence of underinvestment in precedent selection
and high levels of editorial churning, we turn to the more granular question
of whether the textual changes reflect the wholesale insertion of new
provisions and paragraphs or whether editorial churning is pervasive
throughout the document. This question is key to testing the black hole
theory for boilerplate provisions, as we would expect to see the highest
degree of standardization in acquisition agreements at the paragraph or
provision level for boilerplate text if it were being substantively embraced.
We compared the individual paragraphs in each agreement to its
precedent agreement to determine the source for each paragraph in the
agreement. Our challenge was defining what constitutes boilerplate because
of the high degree of edits throughout the agreements. Some types of clauses
are readily classified as “boilerplate” based on their subject matter (e.g.,
Governing Law, Entire Agreement, Waiver of Jury Trial). Many other
clauses, however, do not fall neatly into the boilerplate or non-boilerplate
category, raising the question of how to define boilerplate text. This question
is a threshold issue for empirical analysis of boilerplate in any context, as
text is reused in many ways, even in fully negotiated paragraphs (e.g., jargon
phraseology). But only certain types of reused text reach a sufficiently high
degree of standardization to qualify as boilerplate.
To answer this question, we turn to the data itself. The following figure
presents the distribution of the percentage similarity of paragraphs to their
nearest ancestor paragraph in the precedent agreement, denoted by the solid
31. See generally Coates, supra note 10, at 16–28 (attributing the growth in the length of merger
agreements over the past twenty years to “reactive growth,” such as new case law, statutes, and finance
risks, “innovative growth” such as new ways of achieving client goals, as well as the increase in
“linguistic complexity’ of these documents).
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line.32 For comparison purposes, the dotted line shows the percentage
similarity between paragraphs and the nearest paragraph from a merger
agreement chosen at random (i.e. not the precedent document).

Figure II: Distribution of Similarities Between Paragraphs

32. This data was generated by drawing ten paragraphs at random from each descendant and
computing the normalized edit distance to the closest paragraphs in the immediate ancestor for each such
paragraph.
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The Figure makes it clear that there is a bimodal distribution of
similarity to precedent paragraphs, with a fairly strong bifurcation between
boilerplate provisions and fully negotiated provisions. The right hump in the
solid line is the relatively common boilerplate provisions that are 70–100
percent similar to their precedents. The left hump in the solid line is the
negotiated provisions that are not much more similar than clauses from
random agreements. Interestingly, in the middle there is a range between 40–
70 percent similar where the moderately negotiated provisions in the
precedent agreements are only slightly more similar to each other than the
agreements chosen at random.
The solid line in the Figure makes it clear that merger agreements
contain a large number of boilerplate paragraphs, a large number of fully
negotiated paragraphs, and relatively few paragraphs in between these
extremes. This point validates the idea that boilerplate paragraphs differ
qualitatively, not just quantitatively, from negotiated (generally dealspecific) provisions. Relying on the Figure, we set the threshold for
boilerplate copying at 70 percent similarity and up, which captures most of
the agreements in the boilerplate category. Thus, our analysis focuses on the
degree of continuity or evolution from precedent to the next between
paragraphs that are 70 percent or more similar to one another.33
Our interest is in the paragraphs that are copied over multiple
generations to determine the degree and type of drift from the original
ancestor over time. To examine this drift, we construct a “family tree” for
the set of paragraphs. We begin by taking the set of paragraphs that have no
descendants, which often (but not always) come from later agreements near
the end of our data coverage. We then trace the copying history of each of
those paragraphs back in time, finding its ancestor, the ancestor of the
ancestor, and so on. Because each paragraph has only one immediate
ancestor, these lineages do not branch as they are traced back in time.
We then reverse the direction, constructing a family tree for each
ancestor by tracing the descendants of each ancestor over time using the
reverse-lineages just constructed. Accordingly, we follow the evolution of
each lineage of paragraphs from the original ancestor to all of its direct and
indirect descendants. This creates a tree-like structure for each ancestor.
Some ancestors have many branches (and branches of branches), while
others have a single lineage through time.

33. As Figure II highlights, we could have alternatively set the threshold for boilerplate text at eighty
percent similarity, which would have entailed a very similar data set while still accounting for the extent
of drafting changes from deal to deal.
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We then drew a sample of 28,717 ancestor paragraphs from the total set
of 202,422 ancestor paragraphs to analyze, and we included all descendants
of those ancestor paragraphs. The following table presents some descriptive
statistics about the sample boilerplate paragraphs.
Table III. Descriptive Statistics

Words per Paragraph
Number of Edits per Paragraph per
Generation
Number of Generations per Lineage

Median

Mean

68

88.8

Standard
Deviation
69.7

4

14.4

24.4

2

2.9

1.4

The boilerplate paragraphs tend to be relatively short, with a median
length of 68 words, and tend to have relatively few edits from one generation
to the next, with a median number of words edited of just 4 (about 6 percent
of the median paragraph length). This finding is expected since these are
boilerplate provisions. The lineages also tend to be very short, with the
median lineage only two generations long (meaning that the median
paragraph was copied only once). This latter result occurs because most
merger agreements themselves are copied only once (if at all), with the
descendant never being copied again. This means that there are a lot of “dead
ends” in the evolutionary process. In some cases we find that paragraphs are
copied over many generations of agreements. In other cases, paragraphs are
copied once and then become “extinct.” Having established reasonable
parameters for what constitutes boilerplate provisions in the M&A context
and a framework for identifying family trees for these provisions, we turn to
our analysis of the degree of drift in boilerplate provisions over time.
II. RESULTS
In this Part we examine the evolution of boilerplate clauses from three
different perspectives. First, we examine the extent of drafting drift over
generations between the original boilerplate ancestor provision and direct
and indirect linear descendants. Second, we examine the astounding variety
of descendant clauses produced by a single boilerplate ancestor which evolve
separately along different lineages of precedents. Third, we examine the
geometry of the relationships among the clauses to illustrate spatially the
high degree of divergence in boilerplate provisions over time.
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A. The Drift of Lineages over Time
The theory developed in the “black holes” literature suggests the
possibility that slippage in the drafting process will have cumulative effects
that will distort the boilerplate text. If drafters are unable to identify all nonstandard edits embedded in a precedent document (or simply fail to invest
time in checking for consistency), some of the edits from previous
transactions will be retained in addition to the edits added for the present
transaction. As a result, each generation of a paragraph will tend to differ
more from the original ancestor provision than the last generation. Thus, if
slippage is occurring we should observe paragraphs drifting further from
their original ancestors as the number of generations between the drafts
increases.
To examine whether paragraphs drift over time, we examined all
lineages with at least six generations and compared the text of each
descendant paragraph at each generation to the original ancestor. The results
of this comparison are presented in Figure III below, with point estimates
and 95 percent confidence intervals denoted by the points and bars,
respectively.
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Figure III: Distance From Ancestor by Generation

The amount of average overall drift from one generation to the next is
remarkable considering that because of our focus on boilerplate provisions
most pairs of paragraphs in our analysis only have very slight edits (or even
none in any given generation). Small changes have cumulative effects over
multiple generations, however, eventually producing a descendant that is
quite different from its ancestor in terms of the text. Over a long enough time
horizon the substance of these provisions may be transformed which may
undermine the purpose of having standardized text.
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B. The Heterogeneity of Descendants over Time
This subpart examines the degree of heterogeneity that develops among
the descendants of a particular ancestor over time. In other words, to what
extent does a single ancestor produce a variety of descendant clauses?
Although this question is closely tied to the drift of each lineage over time
examined in subpart A, the two issues are distinct. It is entirely possible that
different lineages from the same ancestor could drift rapidly over time as in
subpart A, yet not diverge from one another. This result would occur, for
example, where the various lineages were responding in tandem to external
shocks, such as changes in the economic or regulatory environment which,
if true, would be consistent with Coates’ thesis of change being driven
primarily by innovation. If, instead, the lineages from the same ancestor
diverge rapidly, the explanation might more plausibly be attributed to
editorial churning rather than rational adaptation.
Because our aim is to examine multiple lineages from the same
ancestor, we exclude clauses that had only one or no descendants. For each
“family tree” descended from an ancestor, we compute the diversity among
the ancestor’s descendants according to the number of generations to connect
them. For example, a sibling pair of paragraphs descended from a common
parent would involve two generations (one up from one sibling to the parent
and one down to the other sibling). For a grandchild to its “uncle” paragraph
the distance would be three (two generations up to the grandparent and one
down to the uncle paragraph. For each such generational “distance” we then
compute the average normalized edit distance among the paragraphs at that
distance to assess the overall heterogeneity by number of generations
removed.
The following Figure sets forth the mean heterogeneity of descendants
of the same ancestor by number of generations separating texts.
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Figure IV: Distance Among Descendants By Generations

The average distance among descendants from the same ancestor
increases with generational separation just as the distance from an ancestor
increases over the generations. Comparing this Figure to Figure III above
shows that the process of “drift” is not only away from ancestors, but also
away from other lineages descended from the same ancestor. Indeed, the rate
of divergence is considerably faster among the descendants than from the
ancestor. The results show that all paragraphs are moving away from one
another in an “expanding universe” of clauses akin to the “Big Bang” theory
on the scale of boilerplate. This finding is consistent with widespread
editorial churning that is haphazard, rather than driven by responses to
exogenous legal events or attempts at innovation.
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C. Geometry of the Clauses
The previous sections show that virtually all boilerplate paragraphs are
moving away from one another in terms of their textual similarity. In this
subpart, we attempt to characterize the evolution of merger agreement
clauses in terms of the geometrical shapes of the groupings of related clauses
in a high-dimensional space. Although it is unusual to think of groups of
contract clauses in terms of their shapes, the concept of difference or distance
lends itself to such a graphical interpretation.
Consider the graphs in the following figure derived from simulated
data.
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Figure V. A Spherically Distributed Cluster and an Ellipsoidal Cluster

The upper graph has a well-defined center (or standard form) with a point
cloud around it. The lower graph is elongated. These two graphs have
approximately the same average distance to the nearest point, but they differ
in the structure of the relationships.
The top plot is similar to what one would expect from documents based
on a standard form. Although parties often can negotiate terms in standard
provisions, parties will reverse deal specific edits in subsequent uses of the
form, meaning that documents based on forms will have a (hyper-)spherical
distribution. This fact does not necessarily mean the documents are only
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lightly edited. As in Figure V, documents can be close to the center or far
from it; the key is that there is a center to which documents tend to revert
because of the use of a form or standardized language. Similarly, documents
not based on forms can change slowly and incrementally, but end up very far
from where they began. The dramatic difference between the two document
clusters turns on the extent to which the past editing history of the document
shapes the form of its descendants. The same logic applies to analysis of
particular provisions of boilerplate language that serve as loci of
standardization within acquisition agreements.
With this background, we now examine the data from the merger
agreements. Although there are many methods that could examine whether
the underlying data have a spherical or non-spherical structure, we use the
eigenvalues derived from a multidimensional scaling of the distance matrices
for sets of related paragraphs (those derived from a common ancestor).34 If
the “clouds” of points representing clauses are roughly spherical, then the
eigenvalues should be close to one another. If, on the other hand, the clouds
have a linear structure to them, at least one of the eigenvalues will tend to be
significantly larger than the other ones.
Indeed, we find that very few of the “family trees” of boilerplate
agreements have the spherical structure we would expect from documents
based on a standard form. The first eigenvalue accounts for a median of .65
of the variation of all the eigenvalues (obtained by dividing the first
eigenvalue by the sum of the eigenvalues). This suggests that a small number
of eigenvectors (or even one) can account for most of the variation,
indicating that our data have a structure that deviates markedly from a
spherical shape.
One important implication of these findings is that there is no “center”
or “standard” to most boilerplate paragraphs. One might expect that the
ancestor paragraphs of a set of descendants would be the “center” of the
descendants, and indeed that would be the case if the ancestor were used as
a “form.” But each paragraph’s form is transient without fixed referents to
which it reverts in subsequent generations. Each successive generation tends
to “wander” farther from the original, leading to elongated lineages rather
than offspring clustered around a central point. The ends of these elongated
“point clouds” bear little resemblance to each other, meaning that new forms
of clauses are constantly arising in a process similar to speciation.

34.

We used the cmdscale( ) function in R, which performs classic multidimensional scaling.
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III. DISCUSSION
Our preliminary results confirm that the clause-by-clause evolution of
merger agreements mirrors the overall evolution of agreements. The changes
that are introduced at each generation of a document’s evolution tend to be
preserved in subsequent generations, causing the text to drift significantly
over time. This finding has a number of implications for the drafting process
as well as the emerging literature on black holes and grey holes in contract
law, which are explored in this Part.
A. Where Does the Evolutionary Process Lead?
The analysis in this paper provides support for the Choi/Scott/Gulati
thesis that the rote use and encrustation processes may lead to black holes in
contracts. Boilerplate provisions in acquisition agreements are recycled
from deal to deal, but idiosyncratic changes aggregate quickly from
generation to generation and potentially alter the substance of these
provisions. We also identified equally significant evidence of “abrasion” as
deletions shaped the evolution of boilerplate terms, even though over time
these provisions, like acquisition agreements as a whole, tended to increase
by length year by year. The data suggests a strong role for slippage in the
drafting process that may lead toward unconsidered and ultimately
unintended variations in documents.
The high and increasing degree of editorial churning in boilerplate text
appears to reflect potential structural shortcomings of the transactional
drafting process. In theory lawyers should know to respect boilerplate
provisions unless there is a deal-specific reason to deviate from the text.35
But in practice both our earlier study of the macro picture of M&A editing
and this analysis of boilerplate text highlight how virtually every aspect of
the agreement is potentially subject to the editing process.36 The extent of
rapid speciation of boilerplate provisions suggests that the substantive
benefits of standardized terms may be at risk. Lawyers’ penchant for editing
may transform not only the text, but also potentially the meaning of
boilerplate provisions. This problem is magnified by the sheer scale of the
process as a multitude of lawyers rapidly edit a complex acquisition
agreement and make a myriad of changes at each stage of the back-and-forth
of negotiations. The problem appears to occur as lawyers process drafts
35. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 296–97 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining that “in routine
transactions the typical agreement consists of a standard printed form that has been prepared by one party
and assented to by the other with little or no opportunity for negotiation”).
36. See Susan L. Brody et al., Legal Drafting 3–5 (1994) (discussing “the myth that drafting is
merely a fill-in-the-blank activity” and explaining the context-specific nature of legal drafting).
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without having anyone ever check back to the initial precedent (or precedent
boilerplate text) to see if the edits are necessary or may potentially transform
the meaning of the boilerplate. The absence of sufficient effort to check for
deviations from standard text may help to explain how idiosyncratic and
cosmetic edits arise and aggregate from one generation of an agreement to
the next.
However, the primary empirical conclusion of this analysis, that edits
in one generation are often passed down to subsequent generations, could
also have other interpretations. For example, it is possible that the edits
improve the document and are retained as part of a process of evolution
toward better agreements. At this preliminary stage, our analysis cannot
definitively resolve the question of whether the cumulative edits over many
generations have effects on M&A boilerplate that are positive, negative, or
neutral. That would require a more fine-grained, qualitative analysis of
individual boilerplate terms to attempt to assess the legal implications of
textual changes over time, which we will pursue in a future work. However,
the fact that the descendants of a common ancestor boilerplate term diverge
from one another is strong evidence of random drift rather than conscious
improvement. The potentially random drift driven by inadvertently copied
deal-specific edits and consequent speciation may lead to black holes or grey
holes as language becomes unmoored from accepted formulations with
established interpretations. We will need to conduct further qualitative
research to analyze in a selective fashion the degree to which the textual
evolution of particular provisions has transformed the substantive meaning
of boilerplate.
B. The Consequences of Drift and Speciation
The drift and speciation characteristics of the evolutionary process may
lead to black holes where boilerplate loses its meaning. But this erosion of
meaning does not necessarily occur in the majority of the cases, at least over
a small number of generations. However, the larger the number of
generations of drift from the original boilerplate, the more likely that the
meaning of boilerplate will evolve over time in tandem with the increasing
level of textual changes. Since lawyers typically choose precedents that are
approximately one year old,37 it would be possible to extend the number of
generations in future studies and engage in fine-grained qualitative analysis
of the meaning of particular provisions.

37.

See Anderson & Manns, supra note 4, at 74–75 & Figure 1.
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One clear consequence of rapid speciation is an erosion in the value of
network effects as ostensibly boilerplate language becomes increasingly less
standardized over time. Our study stipulated that boilerplate consisted of text
that is at least 70 percent or more similar to a paragraph in its immediate
precedent document, which is a high degree of similarity given the
nonstandardized nature of acquisition agreements. But our empirical analysis
shows that the degree of drift effectively undercuts the emergence of truly
standardized boilerplate language in M&A agreements, at least in the sense
of a standardized form that we see in other areas of contracts. This fact
imposes significant costs on market participants.
The first type of cost of nonstandardization is the easiest to see. The
unnecessary effort expended in the drafting process as lawyers introduce
random edits, another set of lawyers using the precedent attempt to
compensate for those edits, and so forth, occurs generation after generation.
This phenomenon is the “editorial churning” that we identified was
occurring on an entire document basis in our previous article. In this paper,
we show that the same churning is occurring on a clause-by-clause level,
which serves as evidence of inefficiency.
The more important costs of the lack of standardization, however, come
through impairment of the network effects that arise through standardization
of boilerplate in other contractual contexts. As ancestors change through
encrustation, abrasion, and rote repetition of encrusted texts, the value of the
network effects decline. As ancestors split into multiple descendant species
based on divergent lineages of precedents and provisions, the network effect
value declines further. In this paper we show that both trends occur in the
M&A boilerplate context. The text both drifts from its original source and
splits into multiple lineages, each of which drifts away from the ancestor and
away from each other.
C. Caveats
Our work provides preliminary evidence for the rote use and
encrustation phenomena in the context of merger agreements. The results
have a number of limitations, however, as detailed in this section.
1. Limited Number of Generations. While our database of acquisition
agreements covers 1994 to 2014, the nature of the SEC’s pre-2001 document
format makes it difficult to engage in paragraph-for-paragraph comparisons
for this earlier period. For this reason we plan to collect additional merger
documents from earlier periods for a future work to ensure that we have more
comprehensive coverage of earlier generations of agreements. Our hope is
that this additional data will make it easier to substantiate both the extent of
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document drift and the degree of erosion of the meaning of boilerplate
provisions over time.
2. Missing or Misidentified Precedents. The starting point for our
analysis is the identification of the likely precedent for each public company
acquisition agreement in our database. We only look for precedent clauses
within the documents determined to constitute the precedent documents. It
is possible the precedent documents are not the actual precedent documents
because the actual precedents are not available in the dataset. It is also
possible that the precedent clauses are not found because the clause was
copied from an agreement other than the precedent for the whole document
(i.e., a clause was swapped from a different precedent).
While we would tend to discount the significance of either of these
possibilities in many cases, we do recognize that much of the “innovation”
in acquisition agreements occurs from copying the innovations of first
movers in other acquisition agreements. For this reason, if an exogenous
legal shock arises, it is quite possible that lawyers will take advantage of
SEC-mandated transparency and the absence of intellectual property
protection to copy and paste relevant provisions from an agreement that is
not the precedent for the current deal. This issue is more significant for our
study of boilerplate than our broader study of the evolution of acquisition
agreements because of our ability to identify the likely precedent for each
agreement with a high degree of probability based on the degree of
similarity.
But we should not overstate the risk that the opportunistic copying of
innovations from unrelated agreements is skewing our boilerplate analysis.
In the case of swapped-in language from another precedent, we would expect
to find large edit distances from the precedent underpinning the current deal.
As shown in Figure II, a typical merger agreement clause does not find close
matches in another random merger agreement, even for boilerplate
provisions. Therefore, we would expect that we would typically not even
identify the swapped-in clause as boilerplate for the purposes of our study.
For this reason the boilerplate provisions that are the focus of our study are
much more likely to have continuity from one precedent to the next. While
numerous edits take place throughout acquisition agreements and boilerplate
provisions, the empirical evidence suggests that piecemeal editing rather
than transplantation of terms from other precedents is the norm.
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CONCLUSION
Our study shows that the high levels of “editorial churning” that take
place in the process of transforming each precedent into the current
acquisition agreement affect agreements on a clause-by-clause basis, not just
an entire document basis. Boilerplate provisions live on from deal to deal,
yet gradually shed their textual integrity and potentially lose their clear
meaning as they evolve over generations of lineages.
We show that incremental changes in boilerplate from one generation
to the next lead to rapid “speciation” of the terms. We demonstrate that this
textual “drift” takes place both within boilerplate that falls within a given
chain of precedent, but also even more broadly for boilerplate provisions that
have a common ancestor precedent, but evolve separately along different
lineages of precedents. Our findings reinforce the black hole concern that
Choi, Gulati, and Scott raised that rote usage, combined with encrustation
and abrasion of terms may distort the degree of standardization and meaning
of boilerplate over even a short number of generations. We plan on building
on this study for future research that is larger in scope and duration and also
integrates qualitative assessments of the evolution of particular boilerplate
provisions over time.
Appendix: Sample Evolution of a Boilerplate Provision
We are including an example of the evolution of a boilerplate provision
to provide a concrete illustration of the extent of changes that routinely occur
over a small number of generations. The following boilerplate representation
attests to the management’s compliance with internal control requirements
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Anyone who is familiar with this requirement
would recognize that this standardized language could easily be carried over
verbatim into subsequent agreements (with the minor exception of the date
in section iv and any adjustment for the numbering of this representation in
subsequent agreements). We highlight the evolution of this boilerplate
provision over four generations in a four-year period to highlight the degree
of (largely) cosmetic changes in the drafting process.38
38

Each of the four generations of the internal controls requirement boilerplate comes from an SEC Edgar
filing: (1) Agreement and Plan of Merger and Reorganization among ON Semiconductor, Inc., Centaur
Acquisition Corporation, and Catalyst Semiconductor, Inc., July 16, 2008, available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/899636/000119312508152773/dex21.htm; (2) Agreement and
Plan of Merger and Reorganization among ON Semiconductor, Pac-10 Acquisition Corporation, and
California Micro Devices Corporation, Dec. 14, 2009, available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/800460/000119312509252521/dex21.htm; (3) Agreement and
Plan of Merger among Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc., Hammer Acquisition, Inc., and Henry
Bros.
Electronics,
Inc.,
Oct.
5,
2010,
available
at
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First Generation
f the acquired corporations have implemented and maintain a system of
internal control over financial reporting as defined in Rules 13a-15(f) and
15d-15(f) under the Exchange Act sufficient to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with GAAP including
without limitation that
i transactions are executed in accordance with management’s
general or specific authorizations
ii transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of
financial statements in conformity with GAAP and to maintain asset
accountability
iii access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management’s general or specific authorization and
iv the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with
respect to any differences since April 27, 2008
a there have not been any changes in the acquired corporations
internal control over financial reporting that have materially affected or are
reasonably likely to materially affect the acquired corporations internal
control over financial reporting and
b all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses as such terms
are defined by the public accounting oversight board have been disclosed to
the company’s outside auditors and the audit committee of the company
board.
Second Generation
In the second generation of this boilerplate provision, the language
was virtually identical (with the understandable exception of a numbering
and a date change until section iv(b). The revised iv(b) and new iv(c) was
as follows (with deletions crossed out and additions underlined):

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099918/000114420410053009/v198560_ex2-1.htm;
(4)
Agreement and Plan of Merger among Aegis Lifestyle, Inc., Morgan Acquisition, Inc., and mktg, inc.,
May 27, 2014, available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/886475/000101905614000764/ex2_1.htm.
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3.4(g)2.4(f) The Acquired Corporations have implemented and
maintain a system of internal control over financial reporting (as defined in
Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f) under the Exchange Act) sufficient to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting
and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in
accordance with GAAP, including, without limitation, that
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s
general or specific authorizations,
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of
financial statements in conformity with GAAP and to maintain asset
accountability,
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management’s general or specific authorization, and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with
respect to any differences. Since March 31, 2009 April 27, 2008,
(a) there have not been any changes in the Acquired Corporations’
internal control over financial reporting that have materially
affected, or are reasonably likely to materially affect, the
Acquired Corporations’ internal control over financial reporting;
and
(b) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses as such
terms in the design or operation of the Acquired Corporations’
internal control over financial reporting which are defined by the
Public Accounting Oversight Board reasonably likely to adversely
affect the Acquired Corporations’ ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information have been disclosed to
the Company’s outside auditors and the audit committee of the
Company Board, and
(c) there has not been any fraud, whether or not material, that
involves management or other employees who have a significant
role in the Acquired Corporations’ internal control over financial
reporting.
Third Generation
The third generation of this boilerplate provision changed the date
and added a non-substantive reference to the company’s disclosure system,
but then retained the second generation’s additions to section iv(b) and added
a significant amount of additional text:
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2.4(f)(g)
The Acquired Corporations have implemented and
maintain a system of internal control over financial reporting (as defined in
Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f) under the Exchange Act) sufficient to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting
and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in
accordance with GAAP, including, without limitation, that
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s
general or specific authorizations,
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of
financial statements in conformity with GAAP and to maintain asset
accountability,
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management’s general or specific authorization, and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with
respect to any differences. Except as set forth in Part 3.4(g) of the
Company’s Disclosure Schedule, since January 1, 2008 Since April 27,
2008,
(A) there have not been any changes in the Acquired
Corporations’ internal control over financial reporting that have materially
affected, or are reasonably likely to materially affect, the Acquired
Corporations’ internal control over financial reporting,
(B) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses (as such
terms are defined by the Public Accounting Oversight Board) have been
disclosed to the Company’s outside auditors and the audit committee of the
Company Board, in the design or operation of the Acquired Corporations’
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the Acquired Corporations’ ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information have been disclosed to the
Company’s outside auditors and the audit committee of the Company’s
board of directors, and
(C) there has not been any fraud, whether or not material, that
involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the
Acquired Corporations’ internal control over financial reporting. Part
3.4(g) of the Company Disclosure Schedule lists, and the Company has
delivered to Parent copies of, all reports and other documents concerning
internal control filed with the SEC or delivered to the Company by its
auditors since the beginning of the first fiscal year of the Company referred
to in clause (i) of the second sentence of Section 3.4(a). Part 3.4(g) of the
Company Disclosure Schedule lists, and the Company has delivered to
Parent copies of, all written descriptions of, and all policies, manuals and
other documents promulgating, such internal accounting controls.
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Fourth Generation
In contrast, by the fourth generation of this boilerplate lineage, the edits
were so far-reaching that the drafters effectively rewrote approximately onehalf of the first generation’s text, which is as follows:
2.4(f)(g) The Acquired Corporations have Company has implemented
and maintains a system of internal control over financial reporting (as
defined in Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f) under the Exchange Act)
sufficient to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of
financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external
purposes in accordance with GAAP, including without limitation and that
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s
general or specific authorizations,
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of
financial statements in conformity with GAAP and to maintain asset
accountability,
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management’s general or specific authorization, and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the
existing assets at provide reasonable intervals and appropriate action is
taken with respect to any differences. Since assurance regarding the
prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use or
disposition of the Company’s assets that could have a material effect on the
Company’s financial statements. Except as set forth in the Company SEC
Reports since April 27, 2008, (a 1, 2012,
(A) there have not been any changes in the Acquired
Corporation’s Company’s internal control over financial reporting that
have materially affected, or are reasonably likely to materially affect, the
Acquired Corporation’s Company’s internal control over financial
reporting, and
(B) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses (as
such terms in the design or operation of the Company’s internal control
over financial reporting which are defined by the Public Accounting
Oversight Board) reasonably likely to adversely affect the Company’s
ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information have
been disclosed to the Company’s outside auditors and the audit committee
of the Company’s board of directors, and
(C) there has not been any fraud, whether or not material, that
involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the
Company’s internal control over financial reporting. The Company Board
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has made available to Parent copies of all material policies, manuals and
other material documents promulgating such internal accounting controls.
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